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John Roberts Jr. succeeded William Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court on September 29, 2005. Since that time, the Court has
granted petitions for certiorari in only a handful of cases to review situa-
tions raising Fourth Amendment questions. This contrasts with the
Rehnquist era, when it was not unusual for the Court to have six or more
cases on the Fourth Amendment every year. This article examines the rea-
sons for this shift and predicts the substantial elimination of Fourth
Amendment litigation in the Roberts Court.
A principal reason is the change in Chief Justices: during his term,
William Rehnquist penned the majority opinion in twenty-five cases. In
contrast, John Roberts, during his brief tenure, has written two majority
opinions. At bottom, it was Rehnquist's interest in the area that drove much
of the volume of cases. However, merely a change in Chief Justices would
not make the Amendment "irrelevant." There has to be more support for
the claim made in the title to this article.
I offer here three additional points to support that conclusion. The first
involves personnel: most of the Justices on the current Court have little
interest in Fourth Amendment cases; in the absence of Rehnquist's leader-
ship, they are less likely to grant review in search and seizure cases. The
other two reasons are more forward-looking. During the 2008-09 term,
Saucier v. Katz' was overruled by Pearson v. Callahan,2 making review of
the merits of Fourth Amendment claims in civil cases much less likely.
Also last term, in Herring v. United States,3 the Court offered a vision of a
much less robust (and applicable) exclusionary rule. If the broader lan-
* Director, National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law, and Research Professor, University
of Mississippi School of Law. (c) Copyright, Thomas K. Clancy, 2009. 1 thank Professor Russell L.
Weaver for inviting me to participate in the Criminal Procedure Forum at Emory University School of
Law, where this paper was first presented.
1. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
2. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
3. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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guage in Herring prevails, it will reduce dramatically the situations where
that remedy is available in criminal cases; courts will be able to avoid liti-
gating the merits of many Fourth Amendment issues by simply assuming
that, even if the Amendment has been violated, the exclusionary rule does
not apply. Hence, combining the impact of Pearson and Herring, there will
be fewer lower court cases addressing the merits of the Fourth Amendment
and, consequently, fewer cases worthy of Supreme Court review. Thus,
even if the exclusionary rule is not overruled, very little litigation, in either
criminal or civil cases, will be before the Court raising a Fourth Amend-
ment claim.
This article sets forth the premises of this prediction in three sections.
The first examines the current Justices' interests in Fourth Amendment
cases, with particular attention paid to the effect of the change in Chief
Justice from Rehnquist to Roberts. The second discusses the impact of the
overruling of Saucier. The third predicts the demise of-or at least broad
limitations on-the exclusionary rule. If these premises hold true, the
Fourth Amendment, while remaining the most commonly implicated aspect
of the Constitution, may lose its status as the most frequently litigated part.
What will remain is a residual, complex jurisprudence with little relevance.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OPINIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
AND THE CURRENT JUSTICES
William Rehnquist served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from
September 26, 1986 to September 3, 2005. During that period, he wrote an
astonishing number of majority opinions on the Fourth Amendment, total-
ing twenty-five in all. These included many of the most important cases of
that time: Sokolow; Sitz; Jimeno; Evans; Ornelas; Robinette; Carter;
Knowles; Wardlow; Bond; Knights; Arvizu; Pringle; Flores-Montano;
Thornton; Mena; and others.4 In addition, the Rehnquist Court issued ten
per curiam decisions, and it is fair to say that Rehnquist had something to
4. The complete list is: Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615 (2004); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366 (2003); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001); Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); Mary-
land v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Omelas v. United States,
517 U. S. 690 (1996); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994);
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990);
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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do with them, given that he dissented in none of those cases. Indeed, Jus-
tice "Per Curiam" wrote more majority opinions when Rehnquist was
Chief Justice than has any of the current Associate Justices of the Court
(excepting only Scalia and Stevens). Rehnquist also served as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court from January 7, 1972 to the date of his eleva-
tion as Chief Justice and, during that period, wrote many of the majority
opinions in Fourth Amendment cases. 5 Regardless of whether one agrees
with his views, Chief Justice Rehnquist's impact on Fourth Amendment
analysis-and his legacy-is substantial.
The contrast could not be more stark. Chief Justice Roberts came to
the Court with virtually no background regarding the Fourth Amendment
6
and, since his elevation, has written two majority opinions7 (one of which
was for an unanimous Court) and one dissent. 8 It is not just a coincidence
that the change in Chief Justices marked the point when the number of
cases began to decline dramatically.
But some readers must be objecting: the Chief Justice is but one vote
in granting petitions for certiorari and, surely, others on the Court will con-
tinue the tradition of granting a significant number of petitions in Fourth
Amendment cases. To respond to this concern, let's look at who else is on
the Court.9 Justice Alito began his tenure on January 31, 2006. Since that
time, he has written no majority opinion, one dissent, and no concurring
opinion in a search or seizure case.10 Justice Breyer, on the Court since
August 3, 1994, has written only two majority opinions I and has dissented
or concurred in twelve other cases. Justice Ginsburg, on the Court since
August 10, 1993, has written four majority opinions' 2 and eleven concur-
5. A partial list includes: INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268
(1978); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
6. See Thomas K. Clancy, Hints of the Future?: John Roberts Jr.'s Fourth Amendment Cases as
an Appellate Judge, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 185 (2005).
7. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695(2009); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
Technically, given that the Court de-constitutionalized the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Herring decision is not a Fourth Amendment case.
8. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
9. The statistics referring to authorship of opinions are through June 30, 2009. At the time this
article was written, Judge Sotomayor's nomination to succeed Associate Justice Souter was pending
before the Senate.
10. Alito's lone dissent is in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). He did write the opinion for
an unanimous Court in Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 808 (2009), which is not a Fourth Amendment
case; instead, as discussed infra, it addresses the manner in which courts must address the substantive
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity claims in civil suits.
11. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
12. Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Chandler v.
20101
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ring or dissenting opinions. Justice Thomas, on the Court since October 23,
1991, has written five majority opinions13 and five concurring or dissenting
opinions. Justice Souter, on the Court from October 9, 1990 through June
30, 2009, had six majority opinions 14 and ten concurring or dissenting
opinions. Justice Kennedy, on the Court since February 18, 1988, has writ-
ten five majority opinions' 5 and thirteen concurring or dissenting opinions.
That leaves the two Associate Justices with the longest tenure. Justice
Scalia, on the Court since September 22, 1986, has authored fifteen major-
ity opinions and has dissented or concurred with an opinion fifteen times.
Scalia's majority opinions, like Rehnquist's, could be used as a broad sur-
vey of modem Supreme Court search and seizure jurisprudence and are
often known by their names: Hicks; Griffin; Murray; Rodriguez; Hodari
D.; Vernonia School District; Whren; Houghton; Kyllo; Devenpeck; Hud-
son; Grubbs; Scott v. Harris; Virginia v. Moore.16 His profound influence
is undeniable: in Hodari D., he redefined the concept of a seizure; in Kyllo,
he broadly attacked the expectation of privacy test and laid the groundwork
for redefining what interests are protected by the Amendment; in Bond and
Hicks, he clarified the concept of a search; in Hudson, as discussed infra,
he broadly attacked and undermined the exclusionary rule. In short, Scalia
has crafted majority opinions that have fundamentally influenced most
aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens has served on the Court since December 19, 1975, and
his term has encompassed the tenure of three different Chief Justices. He
has written only twelve majority or lead opinions, 17 averaging one every
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79 (1994).
13. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999); Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998);
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
14. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Brendlin v. California,
127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31
(2003); Atwater v. City of Largo Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998).
15. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002);
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989);
Nat'l Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
16. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146 (2004); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295
(1999); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990);
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
17. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Richards v. Wis-
consin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79 (1987); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
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three years. Nonetheless, the list is impressive: Payton; Walter; Summers;
Ross; Jacobsen; Maryland v. Garrison; Horton; Richards; Ferguson; Groh;
Caballes; and Gant. Within that list is a mixed record of siding with indi-
viduals and governmental interests. Indeed, Stevens has seen many changes
on the Court and some of those changes include his own views. 18 More
remarkable than the number of majority opinions, however, is the vast
number of his dissents and concurring opinions, which are-by my count-
seventy-five.19
So, what conclusions should be drawn from these statistics? Two cur-
rent members are interested in the Fourth Amendment: Scalia, who seeks to
eliminate the exclusionary rule and expand the use of qualified immunity
analysis; and Stevens, who seems to need to comment on search and sei-
zure matters but has had little influence on the development of those prin-
ciples. When it comes to search and seizure, it is now Scalia's Court.
Frankly, there are few other contestants for that title. To put it charita-
bly, the current "liberal" justices' records are both sparse and mixed. To be
less charitable, those records are at best undistinguished. They have neither
collectively nor individually produced a coherent vision of the Fourth
Amendment that stands in contrast to Scalia's. None has offered a frame-
work for the proper relationship of the individual to society. Sure, there
have been objections. For example, Stevens in Hodari D. maintained that
the Court's (Scalia's) definition of a seizure was too favorable to the gov-
ernment. 20 But one cannot look at the body of Stevens' work and find a
workable theory that offers a coherent accommodation between liberty and
collective security or an effective counterbalance to Scalia's views. To take
(1982); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
18. In Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), Justice Stevens for the majority found a violation of
the particularity requirement so significant in the drafting of a warrant that the officers were not entitled
to qualified immunity. In contrast, in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), in a concurring
opinion, Stevens asserted that a warrant with a similar deficiency did not offend the Fourth Amendment
and the Court did not even have to reach the good faith claim. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
963--66 (1984) (Stevens. J., concurring) (discussing reasons why Sheppard warrant valid).
19. Perhaps Justice Stevens' most influential dissent was in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991). In that case, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, redefined the concept of a seizure, marking
the point at when a person submits to a show of authority by the police or when the police use physical
force. This contrasted to the commonly held view prior to Hodari D. that applicability of the Fourth
Amendment was not dependent upon an individual's actions and that it did not matter if the person
stopped as a result of the intimidating police action. Justice Stevens mounted a significant defense of
that view, arguing, inter alia, that "the character of the citizen's response should not govern the consti-
tutionality of the officer's conduct." Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Numerous states, on independ-
ent state grounds, have rejected the Hodari D. majority's approach based, in large part, on Stevens'
dissent. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
§ 5.1.4.2.5. (2008) (collecting cases).
20. 499 U.S. at 629-48 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
20101
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another example, Breyer, in Bond, contrary to Scalia's majority opinion,
actually opined in dissent that a police officer's squeezing of a bus passen-
ger's luggage was not a search. 21 Breyer did set forth a vision of the exclu-
sionary rule in Hudson, discussed infra, but he grounded that vision in the
shifting sands of deterrence theory.
Scalia stands alone on the current Court. He has vision, force, and per-
severance. It is his Court when it comes to the Fourth Amendment and it is
his goal to make it irrelevant. Of course, there are alternative views, alter-
native voices-but not on this Court. To look for them on the Supreme
Court, one must look to earlier times, some long ago. 22 They were the ad-
vocates of objective criteria to measure reasonableness, such as the warrant
preference rule23 and individualized suspicion,24 and strong advocates of
individual liberty.25 Now, other than Stevens and Scalia, the members of
the Court are disinterested. This leads me to conclude that the trend of the
past few terms-of taking a couple of cases a year-will continue, absent
other factors. I now turn to those other factors.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs in civil damage suits against government agents have two
burdens to overcome. It must be shown that the agent 1) violated the plain-
tiffs Fourth Amendment rights and 2) is not entitled to qualified immunity,
which would bar the law suit from proceeding.26 An agent is entitled to
qualified immunity if the constitutional right violated was not clearly estab-
21. 529 U.S. 334, 339-41 (2000) (Breyer J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Symposium, Great Dissents in Fourth Amendment Cases, 79 MiSS. L.J. (forthcom-
ing Fall 2009). In that symposium, five dissents are examined, including such seminal dissents as
Justice Douglas' dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), Justice O'Connor's dissent in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The authors of the articles that
resulted from the symposium are: Professor Paul Butler of The George Washington University Law
School, Professor Catherine Hancock of Tulane University School of Law, Professor Arnold H. Loewy
of Texas Tech University School of Law, Professor Wayne A. Logan of Florida State University Col-
lege of Law, and Professor Carol S. Steiker of Harvard Law School.
23. Justice Frankfurter, in series of dissents, advocated a central role for the use of a warrant and
the need for objective criteria to measure reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 605 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). Frankfurter is sometimes overlooked because of his refusal to accept application of the Amend-
ment to the states.
24. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (discussing the central role of
probable cause).
25. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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lished at the time of the violation.27 In Saucier,28 the Court established that
courts considering such claims must address the first question prior to de-
termining whether the agent is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court
did so to further the development of Fourth Amendment principles. The
Court explained:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated
on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth prin-
ciples which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly es-
tablished. This is the process for the law's elaboration from case to case,
and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the
question whether the law clearly established that the officer's conduct
was unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 29
Saucier was insistent that the constitutional question was a mandated
"threshold question" and must be the "initial inquiry."'30 This "order of
battle" had been criticized by several justices 31 and the Court had candidly
admitted that it contradicted its policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication
27. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Put another way, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity
unless it would have been clear to a reasonable police officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004); Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999).
28. Saucier, 533 U.S. 194.
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (collecting authorities); Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(advocating skipping to the second inquiry in appropriate cases); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I am concerned that the current [Saucier] rule rigidly requires
courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis
for the decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case before the court.
Indeed when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid 'order of battle' makes little administrative
sense .... ); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019 (2004) ("The 'perceived procedural tangle'
described by Justice SCALIA's dissent.., is a byproduct of an unwise judge-made rule under which
courts must decide whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation before addressing the
question whether the defendant state actor is entitled to qualified immunity."); id. at 1025 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("We should either make clear that constitutional determinations are not insulated from our
review... or else drop any pretense at requiring the ordering in every case.").
Justice Breyer had asserted that the rule in Saucier was problematic for four independent reasons:
Sometimes (e.g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to qualified immunity) Saucier's fixed
order-of-battle rule wastes judicial resources in that it may require courts to answer a difficult
constitutional question unnecessarily. Sometimes (e.g., where the defendant loses the consti-
tutional question but wins on qualified immunity) that order-of-battle rule may immunize an
incorrect constitutional ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-of-battle rule will
spawn constitutional rulings in areas of law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion
rather than clarity. And frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser judicial
counsel "not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoid-
able."
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spector Motor Servs.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)).
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of constitutional issues.32 Nonetheless, the Court had recently reasserted
that it was needed to clearly establish rights for future cases. 33
In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court overruled Saucier and now permits
courts the discretion to skip the preliminary step of establishing whether the
Fourth Amendment has been violated.34 My purpose here is not to argue
the merits of such an overruling;35 instead, the focus is on the consequences
of the Court's unanimous holding. It takes little insight to observe that the
overruling of Saucier will result in fewer courts developing Fourth
Amendment principles and fewer cases presenting such issues for review.
Avoiding the constitutional issue is, after all, the purpose of giving lower
courts the discretion to dispose of the case on qualified immunity
grounds. 36 What will also result is an increased muddling of Fourth
Amendment and qualified immunity analysis. The Court has stated that, in
analyzing qualified immunity claims, "[t]he question is what the officer
reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities to be, when he acted,
32. Id. at 1774.
33. Id. See also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("Deciding the constitutional question
before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public."); County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) ("An immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no
clear standard, constitutional or nonconstitutional.").
34. The Court stated: "The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permit-
ted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." 129 S. Ct.
808, 821 (2009).
35. In Pearson v. Callahan the court rejected stare decisis considerations in light of the experience
that lower courts had with the Saucier rule and criticisms of that rule from a variety of sources, includ-
ing from members of the Court. Id. at 818. Nonetheless, the Pearson Court recognized that a decision
on the merits "is often beneficial." Id. Those situations included when little would be gained in terms of
conservation of resources in just addressing the clearly established prong and when a discussion of the
facts makes it apparent that there was no constitutional violation. Id. However, the Court stated that "the
rigid Saucier procedure comes with a price," including the expenditure of scarce judicial resources and
wasting of the parties' time. Id. It noted that addressing the cases addressing the constitutional question
"often fail to make a meaningful contribution" to the development of Fourth Amendment principles for
a variety of reasons. Id. at 819. Saucier also made it difficult for the prevailing party, who has won on
the qualified immunity issue, to gain review of an adversely decided constitutional issue. The Court
concluded its decision by finding that the govemment's agents were entitled to qualified immunity and
did not address the substantive Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 822.
36. The standard for qualified immunity is equivalent to the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984),
the Court established that evidence seized pursuant to a judicial warrant should not be suppressed unless
the warrant or the affidavit on which it was based was so clearly defective that the officers who exe-
cuted the warrant could not reasonably have relied upon it. Id. at 922-23. The Court explained that
lower courts had "considerable discretion" either to "guide future action by law enforcement officers
and magistrates" by deciding the substantive Fourth Amendment question "before turning to the good-
faith issue" or to "reject suppression motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions by
turning immediately to a consideration of the officers' good faith." Id. at 924-25. In light of that discre-
tion, many courts opt to dispose of cases on the basis of good faith, without first considering whether
there was a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir.
2007).
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under clearly established standards. '37 Those standards will not be further
clarified if courts address only the second question. 38
Indeed, Pearson itself illustrates this point. The case involved an un-
dercover drug buy in a house by an informant. 39 After entering the home
and confirming that the seller had the drugs, the purported buyer signaled
the police, who then entered the house without a warrant. 40 The alleged
seller, after obtaining suppression of the evidence in the criminal case
against him, sued the police. 41 In defense to that suit, a claim was made that
the "consent-once-removed" doctrine, which has been recognized by some
courts, permitted the warrantless intrusion.42 The Supreme Court did not
address the merits of that doctrine, skipping directly to the qualified immu-
nity aspect of the case and finding that the officers were entitled to quali-
fied immunity because the illegality of their actions had not been clearly
established.43 The result of Pearson may become typical: we are left with
uncertainty as to the status of a controversial legal principle that has di-
vided lower courts.
Pearson's new battle order-and the result in Pearson-is likely to
make the avoidance of difficult Fourth Amendment questions the norm in
cases where a defense of qualified immunity is available. 44 Hence, many
37. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001).
38. The Court in Lewis observed:
[l]f the policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity
whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, standards of of-
ficial conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individu-
als. An immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no clear standard, constitutional
or nonconstitutional.
523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998).
39. 129 S. Ct. at 813-14.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A panel of the Tenth Circuit in Pearson confronted the meaning, viability, and scope of that
doctrine. The panel majority stated that "[t]he 'consent-once-removed' doctrine applies when an under-
cover officer enters a house at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent, establishes
probable cause to arrest or search, and then immediately summons other officers for assistance." Calla-
han v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 895-896 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court summarized the
lower court's views, stating "[t]he majority took no issue with application of the doctrine when the
initial consent was granted to an undercover law enforcement officer, but the majority disagreed with
decisions that 'broade[n] this doctrine to grant informants the same capabilities as undercover offi-
cers.' Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 814.
43. Id. at 822-23.
44. Pearson observed that there remain classes of cases where the constitutional issue would be
addressed: "Most of the constitutional issues that are presented in § 1983 damages actions and Bivens
cases also arise in cases in which that defense is not available, such as criminal cases and § 1983 cases
against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cases against individuals where injunctive relief is sought
instead of or in addition to damages." Id. at 822. Despite that ready assurance, these situations may not
offer significant opportunities for development of Fourth Amendment principles. If the exclusionary
rule is overruled or substantially restricted, see discussion infra, there will be little development in
criminal cases. Injunctive relief is a rare claim in Fourth Amendment litigation, at least in the Supreme
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civil cases will no longer be decided by the lower courts on the merits of
the Fourth Amendment claims and, therefore, there will be fewer cases
worthy of review by the Supreme Court. The end result is that the Court
will not take as many cases for review because it can always be said: al-
though the police officer may have violated the Fourth Amendment, that
issue need not be addressed because any such violation was not clearly
established.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The chief enforcement mechanism to insure compliance with the
Fourth Amendment is the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the introduc-
tion of illegally obtained evidence in the government's case-in-chief.
45
Although the rule was for some time considered constitutionally mandated,
the Court now believes that the exclusionary sanction is a judicially created
remedy designed to deter future police misconduct.46 It is not "'a personal
constitutional' right of the party aggrieved"' and it "is neither intended nor
able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered. ',,47
An overriding consideration in contemporary exclusionary rule cases
is the Court's use of a cost-benefit test. On the benefit side of the scale is
Court. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 354 (1987) ("[A] person subject to a statute authorizing
searches without a warrant or probable cause may bring an action seeking a declaration that the statute
is unconstitutional and an injunction barring its implementation."); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 325 (1978) (holding that businessman was entitled to declaratory judgment that statute that author-
ized warrantless inspections violated the Fourth Amendment and injunction enjoining enforcement to
that extent). That leaves claims against municipalities as one of the few avenues to develop search and
seizure principles. Yet, Pearson itself put the viability of that avenue in question:
We also do not think that relaxation of Saucier's mandate is likely to result in a proliferation
of damages claims against local governments. It is hard to see how the Saucier procedure
could have a significant effect on a civil rights plaintiff's decision whether to seek damages
only from a municipal employee or also from the municipality. Whether the Saucier proce-
dure is mandatory or discretionary, the plaintiff will presumably take into account the possi-
bility that the individual defendant will be held to have qualified immunity, and presumably
the plaintiff will seek damages from the municipality as well as the individual employee if the
benefits of doing so (any increase in the likelihood of recovery or collection of damages)
outweigh the litigation costs.
129 S. Ct. at 822 (citation omitted). The purpose of § 1983 actions is to deter the individual officers
from committing constitutional violations and, hence, the governmental agency is not liable on a theory
of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, local
governing bodies are subject to suit for constitutional torts resulting from implementation of local
ordinances, regulations, policies, or customary practices. Id. at 694; see also Hudson v Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 599 (2006) ("Failure to teach and enforce constitutional requirements exposes municipalities
to financial liability.").
45. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
46. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
47. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); id. (quoting Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976).
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only deterrence of police misconduct, despite decades of Supreme Court
declarations that that purpose has never been empirically proven and de-
spite much skepticism about whether the rule does in fact deter.48 On the
other side, according to the Court, is the high cost upon the ability of courts
to ascertain the truth in criminal cases49 and permitting "some guilty defen-
dants [to] go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea
bargains." 50 Thus, the Court in recent decades has restricted application of
the exclusionary rule to instances where its "remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served." 51 Where the rule does not result in
appreciable deterrence of future police misconduct, the Court has viewed
its use as unwarranted. 52
The debate over application of the exclusionary rule often has been
accompanied by references to the efficacy of alternative remedies, with a
chief alternative being civil suits for damages.53 Other considerations in-
clude administrative sanctions against police officers and training programs
48. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("Despite the absence of supportive
empirical evidence, we have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law
enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it.
More importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences
to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system."). Indeed, the Court has sometimes stated that it would reconsider its refusal to extend the rule
to some situations if "future empirical evidence" undermined the assumptions upon which the decision
was based. Krull, 480 U.S. at 352 n.8; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("The debate over the efficacy of an exclusionary rule reveals that deterrence is an empirical
question, not a logical one."). Cf Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A]ny empirical
judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a particular class of cases is necessarily a provi-
sional one."); id. at 942-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court's language... suggests that
some specific empirical basis may support its analyses, the reality is that the Court's opinions represent
inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces of partial and often incon-
clusive data .... By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing the rule solely on the
deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legitimacy. A doctrine that is explained as if it
were an empirical proposition but for which there is only limited empirical support is both inherently
unstable and an easy mark for critics.").
49. Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
50. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. 907 (1984).
51. Id. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
52. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
53. Akhil Reed Amar, in his article, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994), re-ignited much of the debate with his claims that the exclusionary rule should be abolished as
having no legitimate basis and that a "traditional civil-enforcement model" that includes entity liability,
no immunity defenses, punitive damages, class actions, attorneys fees, and injunctive relief, should be
substituted. Numerous scholars disagree with his views, including his historical analysis and the roles of
exclusion and civil actions. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for His-
tory, 63 U. CHt. L. REV. 1771 (1996); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitu-
tional Law, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is
Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). For other scholarly comment in favor of eliminating the
rule, see, for example, Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRiM. L. 603 (2007); Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363.
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to increase compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements. Tradition-
ally, there has been much skepticism about such alternatives-at least in
the criminal trial context.54 Recently, however, a majority of the Court in
Hudson v. Michigan55 pointed to the availability of such alternatives and
higher levels of police professionalism and training in the context of creat-
ing a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for knock and announce
violations. Justice Scalia, writing for the Hudson majority, engaged in an
extended treatment of various developments that he believed called into
question the viability of the exclusionary rule, including the availability of
civil remedies, the "increasing professionalism of police forces, including a
new emphasis on internal police discipline," and "the increasing use of
various forms of citizen review" to "enhance police accountability. '56
At its most fundamental level, Hudson called into question the future
of the exclusionary rule: "We cannot assume that exclusion in this context
is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary de-
terrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the pub-
lic today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed
almost half a century ago."'57 Remove a few words from this quotation and
the rationale for abolition of the rule is clear: "We cannot assume that ex-
clusion... is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was
necessary deterrence ... long ago. That would be forcing the public today
to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost
half a century ago."'58 Abolition is Scalia's clear aim; he has planted the
seeds in Hudson and needs one more vote to reap the harvest.
Justice Breyer's dissent in Hudson challenged much of the majority's
reasoning-but did so by defending the rule as necessary deterrence, 59 a
position that has little empirical support6O and leaves the rule without a
54. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal.
1955); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing inadequacy
of other remedies); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 18 (2001) ("There is general agreement on the ineffectiveness of tort actions under current law.
The reasons most commonly cited are inadequate damages, immunity defenses, individual liability,
juror prejudice, and lack of representation."). Indeed, even Chief Justice Burger, a consistent critic of
the exclusionary rule, recognized the significant limitations that civil remedies offered and called on
Congress to create "an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to afford
compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated." See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421-23
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
56. Id. at 598-99
57. Id. at 597.
58. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 608-09.
60. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, supra note 20, at 622-24 (2008) (discussing the evolution of exclu-
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constitutional grounding. Such grounding cannot indefinitely support the
rule's continued existence. Breyer also saw no reason to believe that the
remedies that the Court found inadequate in Mapp v. Ohio61 would ade-
quately deter unconstitutional police behavior for knock and announce
violations. He noted that, while the number of "cases reporting knock-and-
announce violations are legion," the majority failed to cite a single reported
case in which a plaintiff had collected more than nominal damages. 62
Breyer maintained that civil "actions are 'expensive, time-consuming, not
readily available, and rarely successful."', 63.He viewed "the need for deter-
rence-the critical factor driving this Court's Fourth Amendment cases for
close to a century," as requiring exclusion in Hudson.64 Breyer asserted:
There may be instances in the law where text or history or tradition
leaves room for a judicial decision that rests upon little more than an un-
varnished judicial instinct. But this is not one of them. Rather, our Fourth
Amendment traditions place high value upon protecting privacy in the
home. They emphasize the need to assure that its constitutional protec-
tions are effective, lest the Amendment "sound the word of promise to
the ear but break it to the hope." They include an exclusionary principle,
which since Weeks has formed the centerpiece of the criminal law's ef-
fort to ensure the practical reality of those promises. That is why the
Court should assure itself that any departure from that principle is firmly
grounded in logic, in history, in precedent, and in empirical fact. It has
not done SO. 6 5
Perhaps Breyer's dissent is noble-or perhaps mere noble sentiment.
Arguably, there appear in his Hudson dissent hints of a broader justification
for the rule, that is, that the rule is constitutionally mandated. But Breyer
fails to make that argument. Absent such a ground, Breyer's discussion is
little more than wishful thinking and he, like the majority, continued the
evidence-free debate over the efficacy of deterrence.
This brings us to Herring v. United States. 66 That case can be read
narrowly or broadly. The broader reading signals a dramatic restriction in
the application of the exclusionary rule. Herring, in the short run, will gen-
erate a significant amount of litigation as to which reading is correct and
will require the Court to address its implications. If the broad language
sionary rule doctrine and citing cases and other authority discussing the lack of empirical evidence
supporting deterrence as a justification).
61. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
62. 547U.S.at6lO.
63. Id. (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop-
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1388
(1983))
64. Id.
65. Id. at 629-630.
66. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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employed in Herring prevails, it will fundamentally change the litigation of
motions to suppress in criminal cases. That is, a central question will be
whether the officer had a culpable mental state; if not, the rule will not
apply. If that mode of analysis prevails, it will reduce appreciably the num-
ber of cases addressing the merits of Fourth Amendment claims and expand
dramatically the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule.
Narrowly, the issue in Herring was whether the good faith doctrine
should be applied when police officers in one jurisdiction checked with
employees of the sheriff's office in another jurisdiction and were told that
there was an outstanding warrant for Herring, who was then arrested.
67
Contraband was discovered during the search incident to Herring's ar-
rest.68 The report was in error, and the warrant should have been removed
from the records, but the report was not a result of the negligence of per-
sonnel in the reporting jurisdiction's sheriffs office.
69
Writing for a majority of five, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the ex-
clusionary rule did not apply. A narrow reading of Herring can be drawn
from the following statement by the majority of its holding: "Here the error
was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. We hold
that in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering
all the evidence."'70 Words of limitation jump out from these sentences:
"isolated negligence;" attenuation. 71 Hence, some may see Herring as a
narrow expansion of good faith that has little application. 72
In contrast, the rest of the majority opinion is very broadly written and
represents a significant recasting of modem exclusionary rule theory. In-
stead of viewing the issue as part of a good faith exception to the exclu-
67. Id. at 698-99.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 698.
71. Consistent with a narrow view, Roberts later asserted: "An error that arises from nonrecurring
and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in the
first place." Id. at 702.
72. Justice Kennedy, a crucial fifth vote for the majority in Hudson and Herring, might be at-
tracted to such a view. He joined the Court's opinion in Herring. In Hudson, the majority viewed the
knock-and-announce violation attenuated from the recovery of the evidence in the house. It stated:
"Attenuation... occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained." 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006). Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that the
Hudson "decision determines only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement,
a violation is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify suppression. Id. at 603
(Kennedy, I., concurring). He added that "the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-
announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression." Id. The concept of
attenuation in Hudson and in Herring differs markedly from the concept of attenuation that prevailed in
pre-Hudson Supreme Court jurisprudence. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, supra note 20, at §§ 13.3.1.2,
13.3.6.
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sionary rule, Roberts seemed to dismiss that notion; instead, he viewed
United States v. Leon, 73 the genesis of that exception, as follows:
When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable
cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted "in objec-
tively reasonable reliance" on the subsequently invalidated search war-
rant. We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance
good faith.74
Roberts thereafter expansively refrained exclusionary rule analysis; he
asserted that suppression "turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct. ' 75 He later re-
peated: "The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these
deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement
conduct."'76 He added:
Judge Friendly wrote that "[t]he beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule
to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a prac-
tice... outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation
of rights."'77
Exclusion-and deterrence-appears justified after Herring based on
culpability. It does not further that inquiry, the reasoning goes, to label the
situation as a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, Roberts
recounted several cases of "intentional" and "flagrant" misconduct, includ-
ing in Weeks v. United States,78 the case that initially adopted the exclu-
sionary rule, that would support exclusion. 79 Roberts flatly asserted:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently de-
liberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpa-
ble that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As
laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate,
73. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
74. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701. The label "good faith" is misleading to the extent that it suggests
that the actual belief of the officer is examined. Instead, the inquiry focuses "expressly and exclusively
on the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct, not on his or her subjective 'good faith' (or
'bad faith')." People v. Machupa, 872 P.2d 114, 115 n.l (Cal. 1994). See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 918
("[The Court has] frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect
when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate
the Fourth Amendment."). However, labeling the officer's conduct as "objectively reasonable" has also
been criticized as misleading. For example, Justice Stevens has taken issue with the Court's characteri-
zation of the police's conduct as being objectively reasonable, even if they have not complied with the
Fourth Amendment, because "when probable cause is lacking, then by definition a reasonable person
under the circumstances would not believe there is a fair likelihood that a search will produce evidence
of a crime. Under such circumstances well-trained professionals must know that they are violating the
Constitution." Id. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
76. Id. at 701.
77. Id. at 702 (quoting The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929, 953 (1965) (footnotes omitted)).
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. 129 S. Ct. at 702.
20101
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recur-
ring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that
level.80
The Chief Justice emphasized that negligence is simply not worth the
costs of exclusion. 81 He ended the majority opinion by quoting one of the
more famous statements in opposition to the adoption of the exclusionary
rule and added:
[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence
such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disre-
gard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not
"pay its way." In such a case, the criminal should not "go free because
the constable has blundered."
'82
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dis-
sented.83 Justice Ginsburg certainly did not view the Herring decision as
narrow. 84 She replied with a broad defense of the rule, which is notable for
the fact that, for the first time in decades, a member of the Court has clearly
suggested that the exclusionary rule may be constitutionally based. 85 She
80. Id. at 702. Roberts maintained that recordkeeping errors by the police are not immune from
the exclusionary rule but "the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion."
Id. at 704. He noted: "If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or
to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would
certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation." Id.
at 703.
81. Id. at 702 n.4. Despite all of the Court's references to apparently subjective states of mind,
Roberts added a confusing twist: all of these inquiries are objective ones. He emphasized that "the
pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an 'inquiry into the subjective aware-
ness of arresting officers[.]"' Id. at 703. Factors in making that determination include a "particular
officer's knowledge and experience, but that does not make the test any more subjective than the one
for probable cause, which looks to an officer's knowledge and experience, but not his subjective in-
tent[.]" Id.
82. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
83. Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent joined by Justice Souter, applied a traditional good faith
analysis and concluded that it should not apply in Herring. He added that negligent record keeping
errors were susceptible to deterrence through application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 710-711.
84. As she noted, the Court had cited a view the exclusionary rule "famously held by renowned
jurists Henry J. Friendly and Benjamin Nathan Cardozo." Id. at 706-07. Anyone familiar with the
history of the exclusionary rule debate knows that those two jurists are frequently relied on by oppo-
nents of the rule.
85. Ginsburg stated:
Others have described "a more majestic conception" of the Fourth Amendment and its ad-
junct, the exclusionary rule. Protective of the fundamental "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects," the Amendment "is a constraint on the power of
the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents." I share that vision of the Amendment.
The exclusionary rule is "a remedy necessary to ensure that" the Fourth Amendment's prohi-
bitions "are observed in fact." The rule's service as an essential auxiliary to the Amendment
earlier inclined the Court to hold the two inseparable.
Beyond doubt, a main objective of the rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." But the rule also serves other important purposes: It "enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the
taint of partnership in official lawlessness," and it "assur[es] the people-all potential victims
of unlawful government conduct-that the government would not profit from its lawless be-
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addressed what she perceived as the Court's creation of a system of exclu-
sion based on distinctions between reckless or intentional actions on the
one hand and mere negligence on the other; Ginsburg argued that the rule
was also justified when the police are negligent. She believed that the mis-
take in Herring justified its application 86 and concluded:
Negligent recordkeeping errors by law enforcement threaten individual
liberty, are susceptible to deterrence by the exclusionary rule, and cannot
be remedied effectively through other means. Such errors present no oc-
casion to further erode the exclusionary rule.87
My purpose here is not to argue the merits of Herring but simply to
predict that, if its broader implications are realized, Fourth Amendment
litigation will change to one focused primarily on the culpability of the
government agent and, often, the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim
will not have to be decided. The inquiry after Herring might become a
quest to ascertain police culpability: was there intentional misconduct;
reckless misconduct; a pattern of recurring negligence; or mere negligence?
"Mere negligence" would make many-if not most-Fourth Amendment
violations inappropriate candidates for suppression. For example, a police
officer-instead of relying on information from other officers (as in Her-
ring)-may believe that her actions are reasonable based on her own inves-
tigation, even though the actions do not comply with the Fourth
Amendment. 88 Based on a broad reading of Herring, and consistent with
Pearson, a court could simply skip the merits of a claim and address solely
the lack of an exclusionary remedy. Thus, there would be little reason to
review such a case because it can always be said: although the police offi-
cer may have violated the Fourth Amendment, that issue need not be ad-
dressed because any such violation was merely a result of negligence.
CONCLUSION
As someone who has devoted much of his career to the Fourth
Amendment (and one who believes in its fundamental importance to indi-
vidual liberty and security), the predictions made in this article are at best
discouraging. A grim view of the near future is presented by the combina-
tion of a lack of interest in the area by members of the current Court, an
havior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government."
Id. at 707 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 708.
87. Id.at710.
88. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 934-35 (Miss. 2008) (collecting cases and finding
that, when a police officer, under a reasonable mistake of law, believed that there is probable cause to
make a traffic stop, the stop is valid, even though the vehicle did not violate the law).
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expansion of reliance on qualified immunity analysis in civil cases to avoid
the merits of the claim, and culpability limitations on the application of the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases.
Despite this near term outlook, I am confident that a brighter day will
come. It may not be a bad thing to pause to let new voices develop with
new insights, to let social and technological change occur, and to later re-
examine the fundamental purpose of the Amendment and its role in protect-
ing the security of Americans. The twentieth century produced a continual
rebalancing of the Fourth Amendment's promise of protecting individual
liberty while seeking to permit reasonable governmental intrusions. For
example, beginning at least with Weeks v. United States in 1914, and end-
ing with United States v. Calandra89 in 1974, the exclusionary rule was
thought to be constitutionally based. As early as 1949, Justice Rutledge
said it was too late to question that basis.90 Since 1974, the Court has taken
the opposing view. Although there are no prospects that the Court in the
near future will change its view again, what may prove as equally false as
Rutledge's observations are the ready assurances that the rule is not consti-
tutionally mandated or broadly available. 91 Moreover, given the Court's
approach to the Fourth Amendment in the past several decades and the lack
of strong proponents of individual rights on the Court, it is not necessarily a
bad thing if it reviews few cases.
As Thoreau once said: "I wish to make an extreme statement, if so I
make an emphatic one."' 92 This is to say that the title of this article is over-
stated: the Amendment will not be "irrelevant." It applies to such a broad
range of governmental actions and is too often implicated for such a claim
to be accurate. Nonetheless, in the short term, its substantial irrelevance in
Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to be at hand.
89. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
90. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The view that the
Fourth Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally obtained in federal prosecutions
is one of long standing and firmly established. It is too late in my judgment to question it now."); see
generally Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: The Court That Cried "Wolf', 77 MiSS. L.J. 467
(2007) (discussing evolution of the exclusionary rule).
91. Cf United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (noting that the "debate" within the Court
concerning the rule has always been a warm one and "the evolution of the exclusionary rule has been
marked by sharp divisions in the Court.").
92. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALKING 7 (WLC ed. 2009).
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